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Abstract. One of the most important determinants of the distribution of income and life 
opportunities is education. Increasing levels of formal schooling have contributed to raise 
standards of living and eradicate extreme poverty worldwide in recent decades. However, 
inequality in the distribution of income –which is the single most important indicator of 
relative access to material well-being- remains stubbornly high in most regions of the 
world. In this paper, I focus on two countries, Chile and Norway, which have very different 
educational systems, and follow the same analytical methodology of Schütz et al (2008) to 
detect differences in equality of opportunity between the two countries. In a slight variation, 
the family-background effect here is represented by a larger number of variables –including 
household income-, in order to pinpoint the specific characteristics that it comprises in each 
country. Surprisingly, I find that the family-background effect is stronger in Norway than in 
Chile, which would denote a potential higher inequality. However the higher achievement 
inequality in Chile is determined by other factors, which need urgent reform. 
Keywords. Chile, Norway, education, inequality, equality of opportunity. 
JEL. O15, I24, I25. 
 
1. Introduction 
ver the past few years, as poverty rates have decreased substantially in the 
developing world, concern about the distribution of income and life 
opportunities has taken precedence over the traditional goals of eradication 
of poverty and miserable life conditions in poor countries. While there is 
widespread recognition that the defeat of poverty is far from achieved, economists 
and social scientists have turned their eyes to the analysis of inequality and its 
causes, most notably since the publication of Capital in the 21st century (Piketty, 
2013) and in a growing trend at least since the world financial crisis of 2008. 
Inequality is seen as the greatest injustice of modern times. 
Piketty is not alone in denouncing inequality. Even though nobody seems to 
have gone as far as him in delving into the root causes of the problem –stirring 
worldwide controversy over his results and prescriptions-, there are several others 
that have also tackled the problem from different angles. Chomsky (2011) does it 
from an international perspective, reviving the dependency theories of the 1970s. 
Stiglitz (2012) and Krugman (2007) have warned about the dire consequences that 
inequality would be having on the very same capitalist system and even 
democracy, due to the concentration of economic and political power in the hands 
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of a few. On a more detailed and technical perspective, Reich (2012) explains the 
ways in which inequality is turning markets inefficient and outlines policy 
prescriptions to reverse the trend. 
Nonetheless, whatever might be said about the origin of the current stance in 
terms of inequality, most academic analysts tend to agree that one of the most 
important determinants of the distribution of income and life opportunities is 
education. If there is something that can give an edge to disadvantaged members of 
society is their amount of human capital, especially of the type acquired by 
education. 
In modern societies, education is acquired primarily through formal schooling. 
Increasing levels of formal schooling have contributed to raise standards of living 
and eradicate extreme poverty worldwide in recent decades. However, inequality in 
the distribution of income –which is the single most important indicator of relative 
access to material well-being- remains stubbornly high in most regions of the 
world. Moreover, countries with similar levels of educational attainment –and often 
similar levels of average income- present dramatically different achievements in 
terms of equity. There are good reasons to think that a substantial part of the 
explanation might lie in the features of the educational system adopted by each 
country.  
Schütz, Ursprung & Wößmann (2008) measured equality of opportunity in 
education for 54 countries with data on test scores and demographic characteristics 
provided by the TIMMS standardised international tests of cognitive achievement. 
They identified a “family-background effect” as the main determinant of inequality 
of opportunity in education. In this paper, I focus on two countries, Chile and 
Norway, which have a similar equality ranking in Schütz et al (2008), but very 
different educational systems (one largely privatized and the other one of the free-
education-for-all type), and follow the same analytical methodology to detect 
differences in equality of opportunity between the two countries. However, the 
family-background effect here is represented by a larger number of variables –
including household income-, in order to pinpoint the specific characteristics that it 
comprises in each country. The dataset was obtained from the PISA database for 
the international standardized tests of 2009. 
There are some questions which beg for an answer: Are education systems 
worldwide simply perpetuating the statu quo in terms of distribution of resources? 
Will making education more egalitarian reduce inequality overall and increase 
equality of opportunity for the most disadvantaged people in society? And how do 
we make education more egalitarian? The cases of Chile and Norway shed some 
light into answering these questions. The answers, unfortunately, seem not to be so 
clear-cut. But the elements of analysis that this case study provides could lead to 
policy prescriptions that help to level the field in the game of opportunities. This is 
particularly important at a moment when the Chilean government is proposing 
sweeping reforms that would practically reverse the private-minded education 
system implemented since 1981, in which the State plays only a subsidiary role as 
a provider of education. 
 
2. The Chilean and Norwegian education systems 
In Norway, education is completely socialized. The State sees it as its duty to 
provide free education for all citizens at all its levels. On the other end, citizens 
conceive education as a social right, as is well illustrated by Klingstedt (2001). 
Given the enormous amounts of resources that are destined to the education 
budget, quality is almost assured. For example, a school student can expect to 
receive around 20% of GDP per capita in any given year. Since public education is 
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free, guaranteed and of good quality, there is little space for private initiative in 
education to prosper. The very few private schools that exist have religious or 
special-education purposes. 
School education is divided into kindergarten, primary (grades 1-7), lower 
secondary (8-10) and upper secondary (11-13). Kindergarten, primary and lower 
secondary are managed by the municipalities, with full funding from the State. 
Upper secondary is run by the counties, with State funding as well. One of the 
characteristic features of the Norwegian system that has been highlighted by the 
experts is that tracking of students occurs at a rather late stage, only in upper 
secondary school. 
There is no selection in primary and lower secondary Norwegian education, but 
rather a declared purpose of giving a high level of basic education to all citizens 
aged 6-16. 
By contrast, in Chile most of the primary and secondary education is provided 
by the private sector. The State has a subsidiary role, mainly as a guarantor that 
children in school age will have access to some type of education. There are 
basically three types of schools: fee-paying private (about 10% of the education 
supply), subsidized private (55% and growing) and municipal (35% and declining). 
Both the subsidized private and the municipal ones receive a voucher per student 
from the State.  
The subsidized private schools receive a subsidy because in principle they 
should be mostly free for the students. However, due to circumstances (among 
others, the low amount of the voucher-subsidy), in most of these schools the 
parents have agreed to participate with some form of co-payment to enhance the 
education of their children. This has stirred much controversy in recent years, 
especially due to the fact that some private providers have been obtaining “profits” 
in the management of the schools. 
The Chilean municipal schools are managed by municipal corporations in a 
totally decentralized way. They are not accountable to the Ministry of Education; 
only to the mayor of the municipality. This has increased competition between 
them, trying to capture the greatest possible amount of students, which provides 
them with more voucher-subsidies from the State. As a consequence, the quality in 
many of these public schools has grown, but at the same time municipal budgets 
have been eroded, as the municipalities feel obliged to reinforce the quality of their 
schools by adding financial resources to their funding, to complement the always 
scarce resources of the subsidies. 
Finally, the fee-paying private schools thrive. They represent only around 10% 
of the total education supplied in the system, but they can charge high fees to a 
relatively captive clientele, as parents from the upper Chilean class would not send 
their children anywhere else. They normally have state-of-the-art facilities and 
ample opportunities for the students to develop extra-curricular activities. 
Most analysts of the Chilean system agree that the system cannot last much 
longer without some kind of reform. But the proposals differ radically, ranging 
from a semi-socialization of the system (allowing private schools to function, but 
banning profits and selection, and centralizing the management of the municipal 
schools in the Ministry of Education, as it was before 1981) to a greater 
liberalization that increases the State subsidies for private and municipal 
management. 
Many in Chile see the segregated educational system as the main cause of the 
high level of income inequality in the country, with a Gini coefficient stubbornly 
above 50% for most of its recent history. By contrast, Norway has a Gini of only 
25%. 
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3. Literature on educational inequality 
The family background effect has always been present in determining life 
opportunities, and it gets reflected primarily on the type of education that people 
receive. So education acts sometime as a reinforcing mechanism of inequality, by 
locking in people into their social of economic status. As early as 1968, the 
eminent sociologist James Coleman pondered about this issue (Coleman, 1968), 
and concluded that it is extremely difficult to integrate everyone into the same 
learning environment. However, he maintained hope in the capacity of the teachers 
to integrate the students inside the classroom by understanding their family origin. 
There have been numerous attempts to calculate inequality of access to 
education. Measurements of equality in achievement (ie, quality) are harder to find. 
Both Thomas et al (2000) and Benaabdelaali et al. (2012) calculate Gini indexes of 
education, measuring equality of access, and find very hopeful trends both in 
developed and developing countries. The first study finds a sort of education 
Kuznets curve in an analysis of 85 countries from 1960 to 1990. The second one 
carries out a study of 146 countries in the period 1950-2010, and finds that their 
calculated Gini index of education falls from 0.73 in 1950 to 0.36 in 2010 for 
developing countries. But both studies are basically measuring access, not 
achievement. 
The same trend is found in the school attainment data of Barro & Lee (2010). 
The average years of total schooling at least double for most countries in the period 
1950-2010, and even triple or quadruple for some of them. In Norway they rise 
from 7.5 to 11.8, and in Chile from 4.7 to 9.7. 
But these numbers mask a more subtle reality in the case of many countries. 
What quality of education are children getting in the different countries of the 
world? And how is that quality distributed within the different sectors of society in 
any given country? At least for the case of Chile, this type of analysis is not very 
favourable. Torche (2005) argues that there is persistent educational inequality 
across cohorts since 1950 in Chile, and that social stratification hasn’t changed at 
all, regardless of the change of system in 1981. This educational stratification 
leads, in turn, to low occupational mobility, particularly at the top of the 
socioeconomic ladder. Along the same lines, Núñez & Miranda (2007) state that 
low educational and income mobility have led to an income distribution that is 
quite egalitarian for 80-90% of the population, but very unequal when the top 10% 
is considered. And Carvalho et al. (2013) find that Chile is the most unequal 
country in Latin America in terms of educational achievement, with parental 
education and type of school as the main determinants of this inequality. Ramos et 
al. (2013) have the same impression, pointing to the type of school as one of the 
main factors of discrimination in the labour market in Chile. 
Parry (1997), while celebrating the success of the Chilean process of education 
privatization, already warned of its shortcomings. She argued that the liberal 
reforms of 1981 had introduced the right degree of decentralization for the system 
to work efficiently. However, she observed a regression in terms of equity, 
basically due to the lack of central support and regulation. Amar (2007) adds that 
public expenditure per student is now lower than in 1970. 
Since the type of school seems to be an important element of social and 
economic discrimination in Chile, it is worth asking ourselves why is this the case. 
Drago & Paredes (2011) find that in Chile, when socioeconomic conditions are 
taken into account, the difference of quality between fee-paying private and public 
schools is very small, but there is a significant difference between municipal 
(public) and subsidized private schools, in favour of the latter ones. The authors 
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wonder what might be causing this result. Garces (2009) arrives to the same 
conclusions in a study that measures the determinants of academic achievement of 
10
th
 grade students in national standardized tests. He explains the results by 
differences of the schools in terms of decentralization, accountability and 
resources. The astounding low performance of fee-paying private schools is 
explained by stratification. Going to one of those schools is like belonging to an 
exclusive club. It provides a strong signal in the labour market. 
Mizala & Romaguera (2002) address the problem of low quality of education in 
most Chilean schools by pointing to the lack of incentives. It would be necessary to 
provide incentives to teachers and schools based on their results, rather than just a 
fixed subsidy per student recruited. 
Finally, going deeper into the problem of inequality of opportunity posed by 
unequal achievement, Schütz et al. (2008) carry out a study of 54 countries using 
results of the TIMMS tests. Basically, they try to estimate the family-background 
effect (FBE) on academic achievement. For that purpose, they use a measure of 
“books at home” to represent the socioeconomic level of the household. The higher 
influence of “books at home” would be a reflection of higher inequality of 
opportunity in education. 
 
4. Measuring relative education inequality in Chile and 
Norway 
In what follows, we attempt a very simple exercise using data from the PISA 
test results of 2009, administered by the OECD. These are standardized tests in 
mathematics, science and reading applied to 10
th
 grade students (15-16 years old) 
in different countries. They are administered to some 500 thousand students from 
70 countries around the world, not all members of the OECD. In 2009, the country 
average scores ranged from 325 to 577, with an OECD average of 497. Norway 
had an average score of 500, while Chile obtained 439. 
 
Following Schütz et al (2008), I propose the following basic linear regression: 
 
Tisj = αj + βjFBEisj + γ1jAisj + γ2jGisj + γ3jPSisj + εisj   (1) 
 
T: test scores 
FBE: family background effect 
A: age of student 
G: gender of student 
PS: dummy for attendance to pre-primary school  
i: student, s: school, j: country (1,2) 
 
For FBE I use alternative variables (books at home, parental education, 
household income, study implements at home). 
Additionally, we have added other variables to reflect characteristics of the 
schools which may affect the student’s performance. 
The regressions use panel data with individual observations corresponding to 
one student. The students are grouped in the different schools in which the test is 
given. There are separate regressions for Chile and Norway, in order to compare 
the coefficients between them. 
The explanation of the different variables in the regressions is as follows: 
 Test scores: PISA 2009, OCDE, average of reading, maths and science, max 
723, min 179, mean 469 
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 Books at home (books), 6 cats: 0-10 (1), 11-25 (2), 26-100 (3), 101-200(4), 
201-500(5), 500+(6) 
 Age: in years, with two decimals (15-17) 
 Gender: 1 for male, 0 for female 
 Pre-primary education (pre-prim): 1 yes, 0 no 
 Parental education (par-ed) (average of both parents), 5 cats: ISCED 3A (1), 
ISCED 3B-3C (2), ISCED 2 (3), ISCED 1 (4), ISCED 1 not complete (5). 
Notice that the categories ascend as the level of education decreases. 
 Study implements at home (at-home): availability of desk, own room, quiet 
place, computer, internet connection and printer at home. Each one of them is 
categorized as 1 or 0, depending on whether they are available or not. Then the 
average is taken to construct the variable. 
 Study facilities at school (in-school): availability of library, computer, internet 
connection and printer at school. Each one of them is categorized as 1 or 0, 
depending on whether they are available or not. Then the average is taken to 
construct the variable. 
 Annual household income (h-income): reported by parents. This is in six 
categories, which represent ranges of income. Categories ascend with income. 
 Decentralization of schools (decent): this variable captures the level of 
decentralization of the schools, as reflected by whether the principal or 
governing board (1) take decisions, rather than the regional or national authority 
(0), in matters of salary increases, budget allocation and student admission. The 
three scores are averaged to construct the variable. 
The results of the regressions are presented in Tables 1 to 3. 
 
Table 1. The results of the regressions 
Dep vble: test scores Chile Norway Chile Norway 
Books 8.2 21.4 
  
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
  Par-ed 
  
-6.7 -30.4 
   
[0.000] [0.000] 
Age 6.9 6.1 6.5 8.5 
 
[0.010] [0.123] [0.017] [0.042] 
Gender 9.9 -7.1 8.6 -12.6 
 
[0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] 
Pre-prim 8.5 15.3 8 15.9 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
cons 306 322 347 414 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
     
  obs 4736 3893 4736 3893 
R2 (adjusted) 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.09 
Notes: All regressions have school fixed effects. [P-values in parentheses] 
Source of data: OCDE, PISA 2009 
 
Table 1 presents a summary of the basic regressions. Age, gender and pre-
primary education are used as controls throughout the whole set of regressions. 
They have the expected sign and are significant for the most part. Just as a matter 
of curiosity, the male gender seems to obtain better results in Chile but worse 
results in Norway. An increase in age tends to increase test scores, but not always 
very significantly. And the attendance to pre-primary education always favours 
academic achievement in a clear significant way. 
Surprisingly, the FBE effect, measured by either books or parental education, is 
much stronger in Norway than in Chile, and in a convincingly significant way. 
Which makes us wonder: If not in family background, where is the source of 
inequality in Chile? 
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Table 2. FBE effect 
Dep vble: test scores Chile Norway Chile Norway 
at-home 16.2 126.7 
  
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
  in-school 
  
-5.7 24.6 
   
[0.069] [0.003] 
Age 6.1 7.6 5.9 8.5 
 
[0.022] [0.075] [0.026] [0.049] 
Gender 8.9 -11.9 9.3 -11.7 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Pre-prim 9.1 18.3 9.8 22.3 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
cons 329 258 346 338 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
 
    obs 4736 3893 4736 3893 
R2 (adjusted) 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.02 
Notes: All regressions have school fixed effects. [P-values in parentheses] 
Source of data: OCDE, PISA 2009 
 
In Table 2, we try to measure the FBE in a different way. We assess the 
influence of study implements at home on the test scores. Here the difference in 
favour of Norwegian students is crushing. There seems to leave no space for doubt. 
The family-background effect is definitely stronger in Norway than in Chile. And 
that leads us to a second question: How do the Norwegian schools counter this 
powerful influence of the FBE to produce such incredible egalitarian results in 
terms of academic achievement and opportunities in the labour market? 
We have added two regressions to contrast the influence of the school on scores 
in the two countries. The variable “in-school” summarizes the availability of 
important study facilities at school. The variable has a strong significant influence 
in Norway but not in Chile, which suggests an inefficient use of resources in the 
school system in Chile. 
 
Table 3. Shows two types of regression 
Dep vble: test scores Chile Chile Chile Norway 
 
(school FE) (school FE) (OLS, no FE) (OLS, no FE) 
h-income -1.8 -2.6 
  
 
[0.002] [0.000] 
  at-home 
 
16.9 
  
  
[0.000] 
  in-school 
 
-6.5 
  
  
[0.049] 
  books 
  
20.5 23.2 
   
[0.000] [0.000] 
decent 
  
47 -1.3 
   
[0.000] [0.803] 
Age 9.3 6.7 9.2 6.5 
 
[0.001] [0.018] [0.010] [0.113] 
Gender 26.5 8.3 8.1 -8 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
Pre-prim 10.9 10.4 21.4 18.4 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
cons 268 332 191 307 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
 
    obs 4317 4317 4317 3780 
R2 (adjusted) 0.02 0.05 0.2 0.18 
Notes: [P-values in parentheses] 
Source of data: OCDE, PISA 2009 
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Finally, Table 3 shows two types of regression. The first two regressions try to 
capture the influence of household income on academic achievement in Chile 
(unfortunately the income question was not included in the parent questionnaire for 
Norway). As we can see, when reasonable controls are included, there is no 
advantage of well-off students. On the contrary, it seems that more affluent 
students perform more poorly (complacency?). The robustness of this result is 
tested on regression 2 by adding 2 more control variables, and the significance of 
the previous result is reinforced. 
In conclusion, the family background effect in Chile is very weak (at least on 
academic achievement) and almost non-existent.  
The last two regressions refer to another type of story, which is related to the 
type of reforms that might be needed in Chile. We include in them the usual 
controls plus the most significant FBE variable (books). And we introduce a 
variable that measures the degree of decentralization in the management of the 
schools. In Norway, this variable seems to be not significant at all. By contrast in 
Chile it is one of the most quantitatively (and statistically) significant ones in its 
effect on the test scores. The result tells us that a student from a decentralized 
school can expect to score 47 points more on the tests than their peers of 
centralized schools. The difference with Norway might be due idiosyncratic 
institutional factors, impossible to discern in this study. 
 
5. Some final considerations by way of conclusion 
The Chilean and Norwegian education results are known to produce very 
different results in terms of equality of opportunity before the labour market and 
life situations in general. This is recognized by most analysts of the subject. There 
is an equalizing environment in Norwegian education that somehow channels the 
abilities and capacities of diverse students into paths of productive professional 
development no matter what their family background. 
As we have seen in the results presented in this study, the family background 
effect is very strong in Norway, and apparently stronger than in Chile. The virtues 
of the school system there are strong enough to counter this initial advantage of 
some students and equalize opportunities for all.  
What can be said about this hypothetical superiority of the Norwegian school 
system? At least one thing: The State there devotes many more resources to 
students than in Chile. To give only a few examples: The expenditure per pre-
primary student in Norway doubles that of Chile, and the expenditure per school 
student is three times higher in Norway than in Chile. The ratio of students to 
teaching staff is 23.4 in Chile, while only 10.2 in Norway.  
Reforms are clearly needed in Chile, especially to level the field for more 
disadvantaged students. With a general increase in academic achievement, more 
disadvantaged students would be able to threaten the privileged situation of the 
more affluent ones, whose advantage is based only on social stratification and not 
on achievement. They will become more competitive. 
In summary, this problem of inequality is basically a problem of quality. 
Chile would not do well in scrapping completely the educational system in 
place. Some things are working well; for example the decentralized nature of the 
system. But the country needs to inject many more resources into the system, 
perhaps increasing the amounts of the subsidies both to private and municipal 
schools. 
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